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fA)t'LIPI4JAY. 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATB_o__.F~--1L E 0 f i\lOV 2 9 1963 
B:eRNARD LAWRENCE ALEXA~: _________ ----------------·-ut~h-
DER ----···-··· L S P me Court, 
. . ' C\eu., u 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah 
State. Prison, · 
Defendant and Respondent. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
Case No. 
9856 
STEPHEN L. JOHNSTON, 
Assistant Attorney General,· 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BERNARD LAWRENCE ALEXAN-
DER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah 
State Prison, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 
9856 
BASIS FOR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The respondent, State of Utah, respectfully submits 
that the decision of the court rendered herein November 
7, 1963, remanding the case with directions to the Second 
District Court and ordering appellant's release does not 
properly appraise the significant and important legal issues 
involved in the case. Respondent further contends that 
this court should grant this petition for rehearing and re-
consider its previous decision. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT IGNORES 
THE ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE CASE AND 
THE PREVIOUS PRECEDENT GOVERNING 
THOSE ISSUES. 
It is strongly urged by the State that the sole question 
in this case is whether or not a sentence whereby an erron-
eous place for incarceration is designated is void or whether 
it is only voidable. If it is void-which the State contends 
-the action of Judge Norseth, in denying Alexander's peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus and convening a new sen-
tencing hearing wherein relevant material to appellant's 
sentence was adduced, was correct. Bear in mind that the 
J'udge, at that time, approached the question of punish-
ment as a de novo matter and it was totally within his dis-
cretion to sentence Alexander to one year in the Weber 
County Jail, give him credit for the time served under the 
void sentence, and then to order his release. However, with 
all of the facts in his possession, the Judge exercised his 
exclusive discretion and sentenced Alexander to the State 
Prison. 
If the original sentence by Judge Wahlquist was not 
void, but only an error, it was only correctable on appeal 
by the State and the subsequent action by Judge Norseth 
of resentencing Alexander would be an absolute nullity 
and correctable on review by this court. In this light, the 
State of Utah again strongly urges that the question of 
whether or not a sentence designating the improper place 
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is void has been answered on two previous occasions by 
this very court. The majority opinion in the instant case 
states, after reviewing and reciting the sentence imposed 
by Judge Wahlquist: 
"The sentence for that term was a lawful and 
proper one for the crime charged. Of lesser and 
subordinate importance is that it designated the 
State Prison instead of the County Jail as the place 
it should be served. This was an impropriety which 
could be corrected at the instance of either the de-
fendant or the state." 
In support of this statement, the majority opinion cites the 
case of Ex Parte Tani, 29 Nev. 385, 91 Pac. 137, (1907). 
Such a conclusion appears to fly in the face of the previ-
ously established law on this point as laid down by this 
very court in Frankey v. Patten, 75 Utah 231, 34 Pac. 318 
(1929), and Folck v. Watson, 102 Utah 471, 132 P. 2d 130 
(1942). 
In the Frankey case, the petitioner was convicted of 
violating a city ordinance and was ordered imprisoned in 
the county jail in default of paying the fine imposed. The 
statute applicable provided for imprisonment in the city 
jail. It was held that the sentence was void. The prisoner 
was discharged from imprisonment in the county jail, but 
without prejudice to the right of the city further lawfully 
to proceed in the cause or to the legal right of the peti-
tioner to object to whatever further proceedings might be 
pursued or invoked by the city. The court said: 
"Where the law prescribes a place of imprison-
ment, the court cannot direct a different place. To 
order that a person be imprisoned and confined in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
a place where the law does not allow the court to 
imprison him, said Mr. Justice Field in the case Re 
Bonner (1894), 151 U. S. 258, 38 L. Ed. 152, 14 S. 
Ct. 326, is unauthorized and 'to deny the writ of 
habeas corpus, in such a case, is a virtual suspen-
sion of it.' To the same effect are also the cases 
of In Re Mills (1890), 135 U. S. 263, 34 L. Ed. 107, 
10 S. Ct. 762; Lemmon v. State, (1908), 77 Ohio 
St. 427, 83 N. E. 608; Davis v. Davis (1919), 42 S. 
Dak. 294, 174 N. W. 741; Moulton v. Commonwealth 
(1913), 215 Mass. 525, 102 N. E. 689. The court 
being unauthorized to order the imprisonment of 
the petitioner in the county jail and a judgment in 
such particular void. The detention and imprison-
ment of the petitioner by the sheriff in a county 
jail is unlawful and a petitioner entitled to be dis-
charged therefrom. That is what he seeks by his 
petition, and holding as we do that his . detention 
and imprisonment by the sheriff is unlawful and 
it is our bounden duty to discharge him therefrom." 
To the same effect is the Folck case, wherein appellant was 
convicted in the City Court of Ogden City. On appeal ap-
pellant entered a plea of guilty in the District Court for 
Weber County to a charge . of operating a motor vehicle 
upon a public street while under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor, in violation of an ordinance of Ogden City. The 
District Judge sentenced appellant to be "imprisoned in 
the City Jail of Weber County for six months, and said 
defendant is ordered imprisoned in said County Jail." The 
ordinance under which appellant was convicted provided: 
"Any person convicted of a violation of this 
section shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
City Jail for not less than thirty days nor more 
than six months * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
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Defendant applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the Dis-
trict Court of Weber County and contended that the pun-
ishment imposed upon him was invalid in that the sentenc-
ing court went beyond its jurisdiction in sentencing him 
to a place of confinement other than provided for in the 
ordinance, to-wit, the City Jail. To this the Supreme 
Court held: 
"* * * The contention is well founded, 
where the law prescribed the place of imprisonment, 
the court is without jurisdiction to direct imprison-
ment elsewhere. Frankey v. Patten, 75 Utah 231, 
84 Pac. 318, and cases cited therein. * * * 
"Weber County and Ogden City maintain joint-
ly a building, two floors of which are devoted to 
a jail. The City Jail is on the eleventh floor, the 
County Jail on the twelfth floor, and many of the 
facilities employed in the care and detention of the 
prisoners are common to both jails. This proceed-
ing is avowedly for the purpose of securing from 
the court an announcement of the respective duties 
and obligations of the city and county in this so-
called 'joint' jail and to secure a definition of the 
rights and powers of the officers in charge thereof. 
This court can pass only on questions presented to 
it involving controversies. The validity of the sen-
tence pronounced is here involved and nothing else 
* * *. (Folck) is entitled to be discharged from 
serving a sentence which is herein declared void, 
but as he plead guilty to the charge and it is only 
the sentence and not the judgment of conviction 
which is void, it follows that the lower court has 
jurisdiction to impose a proper sentence." ( Empha-
sis added.) 
Of further interest is an annotation to the celebrated 
Utah case of Lee Lim v. Davis, 75 Utah 245, 284 Pac. 323 
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(1929), found in 76 A. L. R. at page 510, wherein the text 
states: 
"It is generally held that where the law pre-
scribes a place of imprisonment, the court cannot 
direct a different place, and if it does so, the sen-
tence is void and the prisoner is entitled to a dis-
charge, at least from that particular sentence. Ac-
cordingly, in the following cases the prisoner was 
given either an absolute discharge or was dis-
charged from the particular sentence and remanded 
for a new sentence." 
Numerous cases are then cited, among them the case 
of Frankey v. Patten, referred to above. In summary, it 
is the position of the State that the whole question in this 
case is whether or not the original sentence was void. It 
is respondent's position that this point has been well set-
tled in the State of Utah and in the overwhelming major-
ity of other states, and in the federal courts, that it is. It 
follows from this hmypothesis that the subsequent proceed-
ing whereby the prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus was denied, and wherein his sentence was corrected, 
was absolutely appropriate ·and consistent with law. The 
State does not see how any other conclusion can be drawn 
in the light of the authorities extant in the State of Utah 
and elsewhere. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
STEPHEN L. JOHNSTON, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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